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Abstract
Inclusive education is the attempt to educate persons with intellectual disabilities by integrating them
as closely as possible into the normal structures of the educational system. As this necessitates various
kinds of “inclusion through selective exclusion” (partial exemption from grades, special classes, special
treatment by teachers, etc.), inclusive education is inherently faced by tensions. Drawing on sociological
systems theory, we argue that these tensions can be assigned to three levels of the educational system –
the level of the functional macrosystem of education, the level of the organization and the level of the
individual (classroom) interaction. Analyzed in this way, it becomes possible to see that the dilemmas of
inclusive education result from tensions between the three levels – e.g., inclusion into normal educational
organizations requires exclusion from certain functions of the macrosystem of education and so on. The
tensions themselves cannot be fully resolved, but they can certainly be addressed in ways that may be more
satisfactory to individuals with special educational needs.
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Résumé
L’éducation inclusive vise à scolariser les personnes avec des déficiences intellectuelles en les intégrant
le plus étroitement possible dans les structures ordinaires du système éducatif. L’éducation inclusive est
confrontée à des tensions inhérentes aux diverses formes d’« inclusion par exclusion sélective » (exemption
partielle de notation, classes spécialisées, traitement particulier de la part des enseignants, etc.). S’appuyant
sur la théorie sociologique des systèmes, nous avanc¸ons que ces tensions peuvent être attribuées aux trois
niveaux du système éducatif – le niveau fonctionnel du macrosystème de l’éducation, le niveau organisa-
tionnel et le niveau de l’interaction individuelle (classe). À partir de cette analyse, il est possible d’observer
que les dilemmes de l’éducation inclusive résultent des tensions entre ces trois niveaux – ainsi, par exem-
ple, l’inclusion dans des organisations éducatives ordinaires suppose l’exclusion de certaines fonctions du
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macrosystème éducatif. Les tensions elles-mêmes ne peuvent être totalement réduites, mais les fac¸ons dont
elles peuvent être traitées peuvent certainement être plus satisfaisantes pour les personnes avec des besoins
spéciaux.
© 2008 Association ALTER. Publié par Elsevier Masson SAS. Tous droits réservés.
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Introduction
In modern welfare states such as Sweden, the education of persons with intellectual disabilities
continues to be a contested subject. The idea of educating a portion of the population through
partial segregation into a parallel school system, with permeable but nonetheless discernible
boundaries to mainstream schooling, strikes many educators as problematic. Yet in our view,
political and pedagogical calls for increased inclusion of pupils with special educational needs
are all too often rooted in a poor understanding of key features of modern educational systems. In
this article, we therefore argue that the debate on educational inclusion could profit from a more
thorough sociological look at these systems. We will make our argument by means of drawing on
the theory of social systems developed by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. Our main theses
will be that:
• both inclusion and exclusion operate at three distinct levels, that is, the societal, the organiza-
tional and the interactional, and that;
• important, almost paradoxical tensions exist between inclusion and exclusion at these levels.
For the benefit of the reader, we postpone all theorizing to the next section and devote the
remainder of this introduction to a brief historic and political overview of the contested terrain.
During the 1960s and 1970s, increasing criticism against the way children with disabilities
received education emerged in some developed countries. It was argued that education for pupils
with disabilities was organized in a segregated setting. Normalization and integration were for-
mulated as objectives of educational policy. Already since the 1960s, school authorities in several
countries had been obliged by law to give all children the opportunity to be enrolled in regular
classrooms of their neighborhood school with age-appropriate peers, or at least to attend the same
school. Means for achieving this goal were:
• a common curriculum for all forms of education and also;
• compulsory education irrespective of whether pupils are to attend ordinary schools or special
schools.
A result is that the majority of children with disabilities now take part in ordinary education or
special classes organizationally related to ordinary schools. However, children with intellectual
disabilities remain an exception. To include even these children into normal schools and normal
classrooms is one of the aims of the political aspiration of “a school that suits every child”, and
it has become one of the primary objectives of education policies of many developed countries.
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Besides being supported by ethical, economical and political considerations, this policy is based
on the assumption that it is not suitable to have an educational system based on a pedagogy of
segregation. It can be questioned, though, whether the policy ever reached all school yards and
changed all relevant administrative routines.
A turning point in the debate on inclusive education was the adoption of the Salamanca State-
ment. With the UNESCO’s “Salamanca Statement and Framework for Action on Special Needs
Education” (1994), the concept of inclusion replaced the formerly widely used concept of inte-
gration to describe the process of non-discriminatory education in the regular classroom. The
Salamanca Statement proclaims inclusive education as the leading principle in special needs edu-
cation. It states that “those with special educational needs must have access to regular schools
which should accommodate them within a child-centered pedagogy capable of meeting these
needs” (The Salamanca Statement, 1994: p. viii). Inclusive education is regarded as the most
effective means of combating discriminatory attitudes and, moreover, to “provide an effective
education to the majority of children and improve the efficiency and ultimately the cost effec-
tiveness of the entire education system.” (ibid.: p. ix). The Statement is guided by the idea that
the school system must actively adapt itself to the individual learning conditions of children with
special educational needs in order to enable them to realize their potentials.
From a sociological point of view, it deserves mentioning that the ambition to adapt the educa-
tional system to the needs of all children is in accordance with the understanding of disability as
environment relative. According to this understanding, the welfare state cannot simply concen-
trate on a person’s intellectual and/or physical impairments, but must see to the kind of changes in
the person’s environment that need to be made in order to enable him/her to participate in all rel-
evant social functions. As an alternative to a one-sided, individualistic approach, the Salamanca
Statement thus embraces the person–environment relationship. This implies interpreting prob-
lems with reference to the wider environmental, social and cultural contexts in which they occur.
It also implies that resources must be collected, policies implemented and programs developed.
As long as the focus lies on the individual solely, learning difficulties are viewed as limitations
of individuals, but with the focus on the person–environment relationship, learning difficulties
become the result of a complex intersection of factors which all belong to a greater context,
for instance, curriculum, school organization, teachers’ ability and readiness to respond to the
diversity of understanding as well as the lack of self-assurance, and henceforth of motivation of
disabled persons. According to this view, difficulties in receiving education as experienced by
pupils with learning problems are a direct expression of the absence of opportunities to get an
education which is physically accessible, adapted to their specific needs and at the same time
supportive and focused on a strong belief in their potentials. The ideas formulated in the Sala-
manca Statement have direct repercussions on the Swedish debate. Today, the dominant view is
that inclusion/exclusion does not depend on pupils’ different abilities/disabilities but on the ways
in which those differences are viewed and processed by society. Whether society develops toward
integration/inclusion depends on those having the power to influence policy. It is thus a question
of political values and the development of an inclusive pedagogy (Emanuelsson, 2004).
In Sweden and elsewhere, schooling of children with intellectual disabilities is divided in two
groups: those who receive education in special remedial classes and those who are included into
regular classes. Although the former group is excluded from ordinary classes, it is considered to
be included in the system of education, as the law on compulsory education applies. There are
classes for children with intellectual disabilities at both comprehensive school and upper secondary
school levels. The Education Act (Skollag, 1985: p. 1100) states that children with intellectual
disabilities must enroll in regular classes. The municipality has to provide the support they need.
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Most children with intellectual disabilities have such places nowadays. Children who are unable
to attend regular compulsory school or upper secondary due to the severity of their intellectual
impairment attend a special program for children with intellectual disabilities (särskola). Special
remedial classes, adult education for adults with intellectual disabilities and training schools are
school forms that are specially adapted for persons with intellectual disabilities depending on
the severity of their impairment. Throughout the years, special remedial classes have developed
towards a homogenization between regular classes and special remedial classes. The objective
has been that pupils in special remedial classes should receive education that is as similar as
possible with pupils in regular classes. Special remedial classes are intended for children who
are deemed unable to achieve the standard learning objectives of secondary schools because
of some kind of intellectual impairment. The ordinary compulsory school and special remedial
classes follow the same curriculum, though children from special remedial classes get grades
from special remedial classes. This is a way of marking that education of all children, regardless
of learning development, follows the same fundamental values. About three percent of children
at school age in Sweden, about 20,000 children, attend programs for children with intellectual
disabilities. The responsibility for the decision that a child should be enlisted in special remedial
class, once s/he has started school, lies on the school board, but parents must approve or oppose
the enrollment of their child in special remedial class. Only about one percent of the children
go to the special schools. Compulsory schooling for pupils with intellectual disabilities means a
mandatory 9 years of school for all children and youths between the ages of 7–16 years. Beyond
that, pupils are entitled to a 10th, non-compulsory, year to augment this education.
Those who complete a program in the compulsory school for children with intellectual dis-
abilities shall receive a certificate. Upon request, children may also receive a written assessment.
Children who wish may also receive grades for years 8, 9 and 10. Grades are set according to
student achievement in relation to the criteria given in the syllabi for programs for children with
intellectual disabilities. Children who meet the criteria are awarded one of two possible grades:
Pass, or Pass with Distinction. The grading scale for national and specially designed programs
in upper secondary for children with intellectual disabilities also includes two grades: Pass, or
Pass with Distinction. Children who do not achieve a passing grade receive anyhow a certificate
for the program completed. A similar certificate is also issued to children with intellectual dis-
abilities who take vocational training in an individual program. After they have completed their
studies, children in special remedial classes get a certificate, indicating the education they have
gone through. This certificate can, after request from the children’s parents, be amended with an
assessment about his/her studying abilities. The assessment concerns the children’s abilities to
carry on studies.
Those who observe the segregation between special and regular classes from a pedagogical,
ideological, moral or organizational perspective claim that it is accepted because it is assumed that
the procedure which differentiates the two groups reflects the inherent potential of the individual
pupil with respect to being/not being educable in regular classes. In their view, this presumption
might be false. Specifically, it does not take into account in which way the school system is
structured and in which way communication evolves within classrooms. Furthermore, it does not
consider other important conditions in the school environment that affect a pupil’s ability to benefit
from education. These critics argue that learning problems must be understood in a way that also
takes the environment into account. Learning difficulties exist within the context of the classroom
where the curriculum, the competence of the teacher, the resources available, etc. influence the
degree to which pupils can be educated effectively (Porter & Richler, 1991). All this might be true.
What these critics ignore, however, is that the educational system operates internally with certain
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selection criteria that are in themselves discriminatory, namely pass/not-pass, transferable/not
transferable to the next grade and others. One of the questions to be considered in the following
is whether an all-inclusive education would destroy the internal logic of the educational system
for the sake of pedagogical ideology.
International standards not only influence the debate in Sweden, but form also the basis for
Swedish special needs education policy. In one government report on children with special needs,
“inclusion” was defined as the “process which maximizes interaction between disabled and non-
disabled students” (SOU, 1997: p. 121). In earlier school practice (i.e., from the 1960s until the
mid-1970s), inclusion was organized in such a way that teaching of children with special needs was
more or less separated from ordinary class teaching. Thus, inclusion did not necessarily imply that
disabled pupils were in the same classroom as non-disabled pupils, but it implied that the individual
student’s needs became the focal point and that the school was obliged to compensate him/her in
the form of remedial hours, separate teaching groups and the like. Differences between children
were to be accepted and respected and ought not to impede teaching in the same classroom. In
this perspective, differences between remedial teaching and ordinary teaching were played down
and it was demanded (at least in principle) that all teachers have sufficient knowledge in order to
teach all children. Segregation, in this perspective, consequently refers to physical separation and
avoidance of contact. Thus, on this level, the debate concerns the relationship between disabled
children and school organization.
On the ideological and political levels, the debate on inclusive education is fuelled by the fact
that persons with disabilities continue to live a more or less segregated life. Most frequently,
this problem is attributed to the shortcomings of social systems. One of the social systems most
routinely held responsible is the educational system. There is a close relationship, it is claimed,
between education and inclusion in society. Education opens up a door towards a better life, or
is at least a prerequisite towards a better life. This holds for everyone, including those who are
disadvantaged because of social class, ethnic belonging or disability. Education of persons with
disabilities has consequently been one of the target areas of disability research and policy (Barton,
1988).
Traditional conceptions of inclusion
There exists an extensive body of literature on the inclusion of intellectually disabled children
as well as children with behavioral problems into the educational system. In this section, we
shall briefly discuss conceptions of “inclusion”, and we will point out two problems that we see in
them. Because excellent reviews of the literature on inclusion are already available (Emanuelsson,
Persson, & Rosenqvist, 2001; Haug, 1998; Barton, 1988), we confine ourselves to a succinct
discussion of three principal conceptions.
First and probably most fundamentally, inclusion of intellectually disabled children as well
as children with behavioral problems (from now on, we use the abbreviation “disabled children”
to refer to these two groups) can simply mean that these children receive some form of socially
organized education (Skolverket, 2003; Arnell-Gustavsson & Söder, 1979; Pijl, Meijer, & Hegarty,
1997). In the course of the 20th century, this form of inclusion has been achieved in most if not
all Western societies. In Sweden, for example, since the early 1960s, even children with severe
intellectual disabilities are assigned the status of pupils. Irrespective of how severe his or her
intellectual impairment, there is virtually no child that never has the status of a pupil during
his/her lifetime. For this reason, it is hardly surprising that inclusion in this fundamental sense
is nowadays largely taken for granted in the relevant literature (Tideman, 2000; Rosenqvist &
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Tideman, 2000; Gustavsson, 1998). Nevertheless, as we will argue in section 3, it is doubtful that
children which fulfill the social role of pupils without ever acquiring grades can be seen as fully
integrated into the educational system.Second, inclusion of disabled children is often interpreted
as a condition where disabled children and non-disabled children are located in the same schools
and taken care of by the same authorities (Skolverket, 2002). The philosophy of “integration”
that dominated international policy making before the ratification of the Salamanca Statement in
1994 was largely aimed at this second form of inclusion. In section 4, we will argue that even
this organizational form of inclusion faces a central dilemma – using only normal organizational
routines in order to deal with disabled children and supporting them organizationally by means
of special educational efforts are partly incompatible goals.
A third line of thinking sees inclusion mainly as a question of letting disabled and non-
disabled children participate in the same lessons. Based on this conception, a recurrent criticism
of contemporary educational policies is that children with intellectual disabilities often attend
nothing but special classes whereas non-disabled children attend nothing but normal classes
(Gustavsson, 1998; Emanuelsson et al., 2001; Börjesson, 1997). If both groups of children shared
all or at least some lessons, the argument goes, the children would be able to develop deeper
mutual understanding for, or even sympathy with, each other. However, as we will try to show
in section 5, even the normative ideal of shared lessons does not guarantee inclusion, because
physical co-presence is not tantamount to communicative participation.
For the sake of completeness, we mention that inclusion is sometimes interpreted more indi-
rectly as special education that maximizes individuals’ integration into society at large (Tideman,
2000; Haug & Tössebro, 1998). Thus, education is seen as inclusive insofar as it succeeds in mak-
ing disabled children “as normal as possible”, especially in terms of social status and employability.
As sociologists, we note that this success depends on many other factors than just education. It
is therefore not really possible to judge the inclusiveness of any country’s educational system on
the basis of the degree to which intellectually disabled individuals who have completed education
are included into other social spheres. For this reason, we will not consider this conception of
inclusion any further.
To summarize, we observe that inclusion of disabled children in schools is approached at
three different yet mutually conditioned levels, namely at the societal, the organizational and the
interaction level. We are going to follow this structure in our article and discuss inclusion in
schools at those three different levels and point out the specific problems that are linked with each
particular level. In the remainder of this section, we will mention two general problems that many
existing conceptions share, independent of the respective level of analysis they focus on.
First, while we agree that inclusion can occur at the level of society, organization and interaction,
our main objection is that traditional conceptions are unable to free themselves from the topological
connotations of the metaphor of inclusion. Being included is chiefly interpreted as being “together
with” non-disabled children, at all three aforementioned levels. This topological conception of
inclusion represents society, social organizations such as schools and of social interactions such
as lessons naïvely as groups of human beings. In the systems theoretical framework on which
the present article is based, social entities are understood in more abstract terms. According
to systems theory, society is both a social system and differentiated into social subsystems –
from function systems, like the educational system, via organizations, such as schools, down
to the level of face-to-face interactions, such as school lessons. Social systems are understood
as communication systems, that is, composed of a web of interlinked communications. As the
fundamental operation of social systems, communication always involves at least two participants
– one who receives the message and one who can be held responsible for producing it. Because
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social systems are composed of nothing but communications, even the notions of social inclusion
and exclusion need to be understood communicatively. Below, we shall propose an alternative
concept of inclusion, a concept that we derive from Luhmann’s theory of social systems.
Second, traditional conceptions are often expressly or implicitly moralistic (Emmanuelsson,
1976, 1995, 1997; Rosenqvist, 1994, 2000, 2001; Tössebro, 2004). An educational system that fails
to sort out or discriminate among children because of their intellectual achievements is observed
as “good”, any other system as “bad”. Correspondingly, education is seen as inclusive insofar as
it minimizes selection. To defend this ambition, authors often draw on unquestionably important
social values such as solidarity, equality, social justice or democracy (Haug, 1998). While we
do not challenge the relevance of these values, we note that they can easily lead to dangerously
simplistic suggestions for “improving” the social system of education. Mobilizing such values
works almost effortlessly – one can pinpoint a norm and almost directly go over to criticizing
existing structures. Unfortunately, this approach has weighty sociological predecessors. In many
sociological theories (from Durkheim via Parsons to Habermas), social integration is assumed
to be maintained through values. Morality or some common cultural values are what integrates
groups or systems and “glues” them together. As far as Parsons is concerned, he holds that a social
system can only maintain its balance if a number of basic functions are fulfilled, that is, social goals
have to be set, adaptation and integration must be possible and the individual’s motivation must
be maintained. For these functions to have the desired effect, the individual has to be socialized,
and this socialization must be followed up by control (Parsons, 1951).
The problem we see in moralistic finger-pointing is not that the values which usually are
mobilized are not universal – after all, who could nowadays argue against tolerance or equality?
Rather, the problem seems to be that a priori “critical” discussions of inclusion invite theoretically
unfortunate simplifications. This effect is largely due to the communicative logic of values them-
selves, which specify practically unreachable goals and thereby permit observing any state of the
world as deficient relative to them. It is worth noting that social philosophers tend to know that all
values are riddled with paradoxes (e.g., for the case of equality, Nagel, 1991). Because values can
depict any concrete social situation as deficient, arguments that mobilize values may generally
allow themselves to disregard practical considerations, such as the costs or the organizational
implementability of inclusion policies. For this reason, the aim of this article is first and foremost
to describe both the possibilities and the limitations associated with inclusion of disabled children
at three levels of social order:
• the societal level, which refers to the system of education and its relationship to other function
systems of society;
• the organizational level, particularly schools, and;
• the interaction level, particularly the classroom. The next three sections follow this structure.
We will also try to establish that inclusion faces central dilemmas at all three levels.
Inclusion and exclusion at the societal level
Nowadays, all the developed and even most of the developing nations possess large, complex
and publicly administered social systems that take care of the education of children for up to
13 years of their lives. If one understands “inclusion” into these systems as simply meaning that
children receive some form of publicly administered education, it is safe to say that at least the
educational systems of the developed countries have become virtually all-inclusive. Possibly for
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this reason, fundamental inclusion of intellectually disabled children as well as children with
behavioral problems into the educational system is hardly ever seen as problematic – after all,
they are being educated, whether or not the form of education they receive deserves criticism.
In this section, we will draw on the theoretical framework of social systems theory in order
to show that it is doubtful that intellectually disabled children are actually included into the
educational systems of these countries. However, to understand how we arrive at this observation,
it is necessary to consider first how the educational system relates to other function systems which
are potentially capable of including/excluding persons. After a brief inspection of social systems
theory’s views on this issue, we will argue that inclusion into a function system means being
able to produce and to be addressed by communications that execute the system’s central social
function. As it turns out, intellectually disabled children are excluded from education insofar as
they are not observed in terms of one of the two central functions of the educational system – that
is, the function of performance evaluation.
Ever since Marx developed his theory of class conflict, social scientific thinkers saw and
continue to see modern society as ordered by some form of basic differentiation. In social systems
theory, especially as developed in the works of Talcott Parsons (1951) and Niklas Luhmann (1995),
older ideas of hierarchical or stratified differentiation have been replaced by the idea that modern
society is primarily functionally differentiated. In Luhmann’s most recent version (Luhmann,
1997), on which the following discussion is based, the primary social systems into which society
is composed are politics, law, economy, science, religion, art and education (others are conceivable,
such as health care and sports, but they have not been discussed as thoroughly by Luhmann).
Each of these systems fulfills a specific though highly abstract function for society, this being
the reason why systems theory refers to them as function systems. For instance, the function of
the legal system is to stabilize expectations, which has nothing to do with creating justice, peace
or harmony. A reliable legal system allows people to anticipate under which conditions they are
likely to win conflicts, thus giving some of them incentives to start conflicts in the first place.
To give another example, the function of the political system is to make power subject to social
organization. Again, this function is far more abstract than social values such as balance of power
or good leadership. Under the terrible rule of Saddam Hussein, the political system of Iraq fulfilled
its function quite reliably.
Function systems, as all other social systems in Luhmann’s theory, are communication systems.
They are composed neither of people nor of actions, but of communications. What distinguishes
function systems from other types of social systems – most importantly, organizations and inter-
action systems – is the mode by which they acquire their unity as a system. Whereas interaction
systems are unified by way of participants’ co-presence and organizations by way of member-
ship or references to the organizational identity, function systems are unified by way of media of
communication (e.g., money in the economy, power in the political system and so on). The media
operate and are identified through unambiguous binary codes (payment/non-payment, power-
ful/powerless and so on). Thus, every function system can be identified by means of a medium of
communication and a binary code. Besides reducing complexity, communication media stabilize
expectations and thereby prevent disappointments. Money makes access to commodities possible;
power makes it possible to condition other people’s actions and so on.
In many ways, the function system of education is special. First, all participants in educational
communication have to be members in organizations – that is, schools or one of the authorities
that administer or constrain communication in schools. This holds both for senders of educating
communications (teachers), for recipients (pupils) and for those who are otherwise involved in
the administration of educating communication (e.g., through involvement in the development of
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curricula). The membership requirement does not exist in other function systems – for instance,
one can be prosecuted without being a member of a legal organization, one can make a payment
without having a bank account and so on.
Second, in contrast to other function systems, the medium of communication which makes
communication recognizable as educational is not an impersonal abstraction such as money (eco-
nomic system), power (political system) or truth (scientific system), but a specific type of person:
the pupil (Luhmann, 1991). All educational communication refers explicitly or implicitly to per-
sons of this type (for an extensive discussion on this topic see Cederström, Qvortrup, & Rasmussen,
1993). Education aims at influencing and steering their psychosocial development, and it is its
observable capacity of producing obedient, smart or creative pupils (socially desired results vary
historically and cross-culturally) which tends to serve as the ultimate social measure of whether
education is “successful” or not. In consequence, for education to be possible, the educational
system assumes pupils to be perfectible and it assumes that it is generally possible to convey
knowledge to them.
Third, the educational system is also unique in that its evolution has been guided by its
fulfillment of two central societal functions (Luhmann & Schorr, 2000), rather than just one:
• the function of education, which involves exerting socially organized control over children’s
secondary socialization, and;
• the function of performance evaluation, which involves making children’s responses to educa-
tional communication easily observable in terms of grades and school certificates.
The first function, controlling secondary socialization, is certainly indisputable and has been
acknowledged since antiquity (Aristotle, 2001: Book VII, chapter XV and Book VIII; Plutarch,
1989: chapter “On the education of children”). Quite fundamentally, to educate is to convey an
existing body of knowledge and skills to pupils. As the latter are not just passive receptacles
but active, self-determined and self-organizing beings, the process is likely to meet problems
and resistance, but also likely to lead to the acquisition of secondary skills such as obedience,
problem-solving, learning to learn and so on. These contingencies have led to the emergence of the
scientific discipline of pedagogy, which tries to generate knowledge about the indeterminacies
involved with educational communication. However, no deterministic method for overcoming
these indeterminacies exists today, a problem to which Luhmann often refers as the “technology
deficit” of education (Luhmann & Schorr, 1982).
The second function, making pupils’ responses to education socially observable, solves a
problem associated with the first function. Historically, as long as curricula remained simple,
static and identical for all pupils, mere teaching sufficed to ensure that most pupils were educated
and socialized in the right way. With today’s complex and ever-changing curricula, multiple levels
of schooling (from preschool to elite secondary schools) and overwhelming amounts of choices
(from courses to entire programs), the psychosocial results of education cannot be predicted from
its socially defined contents alone. Thus, with few but relevant exceptions (more on that below),
modern schools periodically attribute every pupil extremely simple, but therefore comparable
grades which are supposed to summarize the pupil’s performance in individual courses, subjects,
or even in his/her entire schooling career. Observation in terms of grades does not hold the pupil
responsible for the fact that a grade has been given, but it holds him/her responsible for the specific
value of the grade. Thus, whether the pupil passes, passes with distinction or does not pass at
all is supposed to reflect a (largely inextricable) combination of intellectual abilities and learning
efforts. It is not supposed to be a mere reflection of the objective difficulty of the evaluation.
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Grades contain no reference to the taught contents – as Luhmann tellingly formulates it, the
school system does not differentiate between sine and cosine, but between those who can handle
that difference and those who cannot (Luhmann & Schorr, 2000). Grades and certificates not
only differentiate pupils in terms of relative performance (e.g., a Swedish pupil who earned a VG
has performed better than one who got a G), but also in terms of absolute performance (an F in
the USA, a 5 in Germany, a U in Sweden all mean “not pass”). Although this absolute form of
observation has often been criticized by pedagogy, it has the observational advantage of reducing
complexity. Observations of individual performance depends less on the performance of all other
individuals and more on the (however arbitrarily) measured performance of the individual in the
test situation.
It is safe to say that grades are deeply built into the organizational communication of institutions
within the educational system as well as in the ways in which other social systems observe educated
persons. Within the educational system, grades influence or determine the annual decisions about
having to/not having to repeat the year, about the necessity of special remedial measures (e.g.,
additional or private lessons) and even about organizational membership (e.g., when achievements
are deemed generally insufficient), among many other decisions. Because teachers are expected to
be able to justify the grades they give, grades also grant schools a fundamental form of control over
their teachers. Furthermore, as grades can be counted up and averaged out by simple statistical
procedures, they grant authorities further up in the hierarchy a fundamental form of control
over schools. Far from merely cementing existing structures, they provide a basis for deciding
about improvements and reforms, and even for evaluating the success of reforms after their
implementation. Outside the educational system, organizations such as firms, universities or public
authorities frequently base their recruitment decisions on grades, and the “public” at large uses
them to grant or withhold positive status evaluations. Whatever illusions one may have about the
possibility of abolishing grades, it is clear that these and many other social applications of grades
would (have to) be replaced by some functional equivalent – which, after all, would probably
resemble the concept of grades to a considerable extent. For the descriptive purposes of this
article, we choose to be realistic and to see grades eo ipso as a fact of social life.
Systems theoretical reflections on the structure of the educational system and its relationship to
society may provide the basis for a better understanding of what it means for persons to be included
or excluded from the educational system. In principle, functional differentiation involves that each
function system regulates inclusion/exclusion of individuals autonomously. In some systems,
communicative prerequisites for inclusion are minimal – for instance, in order to participate in
the economic system, it is formally sufficient to own, to spend or to receive a minimal amount
of money. In other systems, inclusion is more restricted – for instance, in order to participate in
scientific communication, it is normally necessary to undergo higher education and to acquire
an academic degree. At least in developed countries, basic inclusion into the educational system
depends originally only on whether a child has reached school-age. After the child has been a
member for the required number of years or levels, basic inclusion begins to depend on how the
educational system has observed his or her performance in school. For persons beyond school-age,
re-inclusion requires formal employment as a teacher or a member of the administrative staff of
schools or other educational authorities.
If we confine ourselves to children of school-age, fundamental inclusion into the educational
system of developed countries seems to be virtually total and exclusion virtually absent. For
instance, in Sweden, since 1967, even children with severe intellectual disabilities are entitled to
education. Thus, it seems fair to say that a modern educational system fulfills the first of their two
functions – the function of education – with respect to almost every child of school-age.
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However, the educational system fails to fulfill its second function – that of performance evalua-
tion – with respect to intellectually disabled children. This observation is uncontroversial because
the absence of performance evaluation is intentional. Since diagnoses of intellectual disability
are partly based on school-like tests, intellectually disabled children are almost guaranteed to
perform worse in intellectual problem-solving tasks than non-disabled children. What is more,
performance often varies enormously within a group of children defined as intellectually disabled.
In consequence, relative performance variations within such a group can largely be explained by
the diagnosed severities of the children’s disabilities. In sum, this construction logic entails that it
becomes impossible for the educational system to attribute performance differences of intellec-
tually disabled children to contingent factors such as diligence or motivation. A basic intent of
grading – holding individuals responsible for their achievements – is thwarted.
We want to suggest that education’s renunciation of evaluating intellectually disabled children
in terms of grades constitutes an unavoidable yet significant form of exclusion. We mentioned
before that social systems theory provides a way of overcoming the topological connotations of the
terms “inclusion” and “exclusion”. Social systems are observed as networks of self-reproducing
communications. As a strict consequence of this theoretical turn, we conceive of inclusion of a
person into a social system as participation (either as sender or receiver) in its communications.
The assignment of grades is a key type of communication within the educational system. As
intellectually disabled children are excluded from assignments of grades, they are also excluded
from the aforementioned large set of communications inside and outside of the educational system
that processes grades.
Internally, the educational system has routinized this exclusion successfully. In contrast to
normal education, special education focuses exclusively on the imparting of skills and knowledge,
and it frames this function emphatically as “support”. Because grades are not applied, each year
pupils in special schools can count on moving up to the next level, independent of the amount of
skills and knowledge they have acquired. In their socialization, school is not an endless sequence
of contingent and annoying examinations, but a “natural enclave” (Gustavsson, 1998) that protects
them temporarily from the stigmatizing reactions of those who are excluded from this enclave.
Even outside of the educational system, the exemption of intellectually disabled children from
grading has been dealt with, routinized and thus has led to re-inclusion. In modern welfare states,
the concept of disability regulates whether social resources are distributed according to ability or
according to need. This idea is due to Stone (1985), who sees the disability concept as the welfare
state’s solution to a distributive dilemma. From the perspective of the welfare state, disability does
not reflect an essential property but constitutes a social construction. Through this construction,
citizens are divided into those who are (at least temporarily) able to earn their own income and
those who require permanent support. The main merit of the construction is that distribution in
terms of performance and distribution in terms of needs are coordinated without one undermining
the other.
We add that this regulative success comes at a certain price. For coordination to be possible,
the attribution of disability needs to be permanent. In order to discourage individuals who are able
to earn their own income from claiming access to need-based benefits, the disability-construction
needs to be – and usually is – highly inflexible. The identification as intellectually disabled is
among the least flexible. Once one has received this identification, it is difficult to get rid of. The
educational system sets the course for the social durability of this identification. For one, switching
from special school to normal school is usually difficult and discouraged. What is more, exemption
from grades renders identification as intellectually disabled even more durable, because the pupil
now lacks a key prerequisite for proving that he or she has been misidentified. In a sense, much
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of the welfare apparatus that exists for the support of intellectually disabled persons processes
the inability or the unwillingness of the educational system to differentiate intellectually disabled
children in terms of performance.
If both education and society at large are so wonderfully capable of including or re-including
intellectually disabled children, why should their exclusion from performance evaluations be
observed as a problem? We mentioned that since grades and school certificates are so widely
applied, not having them is highly consequential. For instance, exclusion from the labor market
and inclusion into the welfare system are virtually guaranteed to occur. Thus, the problem – or
rather, the dilemma – is not that society cannot deal with the partial exclusion of intellectually
disabled children from education, but that this exclusion channels and patterns their life-courses
in such foreseeable a way that they themselves (or, more likely, non-disabled observers) may
experience debarment from the multitude of choices and options non-disabled members of modern
society usually have.
Inclusion and exclusion at the organizational level
Organization systems represent another type of communication system. Social systems are
characterized as organizations when they achieve unity by way of distinguishing persons into
members and non-members. Membership is always selective and attached to particular condi-
tions, which means effectively that organizations make communicative inclusion and exclusion
dependent on these conditions. According to Luhmann, decisions are the principal type of com-
munications that reproduce organization systems. As membership is selective, it also depends on
decisions. A person, a committee or an organizational routine decides – usually conditioned by
earlier decisions, such as statutes – that a person becomes a member. From a systems-theoretical
perspective, schools are almost ideal-typical organization systems. We can discern different types
of memberships within schools, such as teachers, administrative personnel, pupils or assistants.
Membership in schools is regulated formally, as is membership in their organizational sub-
systems. For instance, whether a pupil belongs into a special school, a normal school, a regular
class or a special remedial class within a normal school depends on observations of the pupil’s
intellectual ability/disability.
The educational system is unique insofar as inclusion into it presupposes inclusion into some
kind of organization (usually a school). No other function system creates this connection. In this
section, we shall argue that even inclusion into organizations within the educational system is
characterized by a central dilemma. Specifically, as long as intellectually disabled children are
institutionally differentiated from normal children, measures for organizational re-inclusion of
the former are likely to be accompanied by (possibly less visible but still momentous) forms of
organizational re-exclusion.
Historically, in Sweden but also in other countries, the total expansion of the educational system
and its organizational differentiation came simultaneously. In order to include even intellectually
disabled pupils into the system, special remedial classes (särskola) were established in two steps,
1944 for mildly and 1967 for severely intellectually disabled pupils. It is interesting to see that the
system’s solution to inclusion was organizational differentiation, which might strike the observer
as unnecessarily complicated. However, it can be argued that this was a rather simple solution,
since the system of regular classes itself was not affected by admitting intellectually disabled
children. Only special remedial classes had to be designed and new curricula as well as new
teacher positions had to be established. In systems-theoretical terms, the fundamental function
fulfilled by organizational separation of regular and special schools or classes consists of reduction
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of complexity in the psychological environment of the organization, where the psychological
complexity to be reduced is the effect of a tremendous heterogeneity of children’s abilities and
disabilities. As is common for social systems, the educational system thus increased its own
communicative complexity (i.e., differentiated normal from special schools/classes) in order to
reduce complexity in its environment.
Organizational segregation of intellectually disabled children co-constitutes their identity as
intellectually disabled children. Children in special schools or special classes are intellectually dis-
abled in virtue of the sub-systems they are members in. From the perspective of the organization,
the category “intellectually disabled” is a construction that occurs in relation to the general school
attendance mandate. Historically, when intellectually disabled children were incarcerated in spe-
cial institutions during the great incarceration period of the 17th century (Stiker, 1999; Ravaud &
Stiker, 2001), their institutional membership defined them – and made them identifiable – as idiots.
Although psychological intentions may have changed from ignorance or contempt to goodwill,
the same logic applies even today. School authorities define the knowledge or the well-adjusted
behavior children should acquire and then divide children into those who are able to achieve these
aims in regular ways and those who require special assistance in order to achieve at least a fraction
of them. It is this sorting procedure that gives rise to special schools, special remedial classes
and, ultimately, even special pedagogic. However, as indicated in a report from Swedish School
Authorities, it is an extremely contingent procedure. It has been estimated that between the year
1992/93 and 2000/01, pupils in special remedial classes increased with 63% (Skolverket, 2003;
Tideman, 1994, 1997a, 1997b) because decreased resources for regular classes entailed that more
and more pupils were unable to function without additional support. Thus, although the procedure
is highly contingent, its capacity to produce children with learning disabilities expanded tremen-
dously in Sweden during the 1990s as an effect of reductions in public spending of the Swedish
welfare system, reductions that were an effect of both economic regression and of distending
the category of children in need by including even those with diagnosed with Attention-Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Deficits in Attention, Motor Control and Perception (DAMP),
Asperger’s Syndrome and other new diseases and disabilities.
Within a systems-theoretical framework, what seems most interesting are the communicative
consequences of the fact that a group of children is organizationally differentiated from all other
children. When the distinction between educable/uneducable children was abolished from leg-
islation in order to ensure the access to the educational system by all children, exclusion at the
societal level was effectively replaced by exclusion at the organizational level. The distinction
educable/uneducable applied at the level of the function system and excluded intellectually dis-
abled people from any form of education. The distinction regular/special classes, on the other
hand, applies at the organizational level and excludes intellectually disabled in a less obvious
way. As bearers of different social identities and members of different classes, normal and intel-
lectually disabled children are addressed by different organizational communications. Regular
classes for normal children and special classes for intellectually disabled children are different
communication systems – no matter whether they take place in the same building (or, as in Swe-
den, sometimes even in the same classroom) and are administered by the same authority. The
boundaries of communication systems are not defined by physical locations, but by communica-
tive codes. In the case of classes, which systems theory observes as dependent sub-organizations
in the organization system “school”, the delimiting criterion is membership. Non-disabled chil-
dren are communicatively addressed and treated as members of regular classes, disabled children
remain outsiders – and vice versa in the case of special classes. Intellectual ability is the condition
for qualifying for membership in a regular class, whereas intellectual disability certified by the
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school board is the qualification for attending a special class. These boundaries are communica-
tively momentous. They define under what conditions pupils may speak of “us” versus “them”,
they specify who spends most of his or her time with whom, they define what pupils are going
to be together on school outings, among a myriad of other things. They also help upholding the
communicative order of normal lessons. By being separated from special lessons, normal lessons
are not just made simpler and more homogenous. Rather, it is also easier to hold each and every
attendant of normal lessons responsible for the learning progress he or she makes. By being
defined as normal instead of disabled, pupils do not have an excuse for not grasping the contents
of a lesson, which means that the teacher can observe pupils as lazy (rather than being forced to
observe him-/herself as overdemanding or pedagogically unskilled).
During the last years, efforts have been made in Sweden to decrease organizational segregation
of intellectually disabled children. This ambition is captured in the Swedish slogan, En skola för
alla, meaning “One school for all” (Lööw, 2002). Critics of this slogan appeal to realism, claiming
that severe intellectual disabilities cannot be compensated no matter what financial resources are
available, and arguing that inclusion of intellectually disabled children would worsen conditions
for non-disabled pupils (Lindblad & Popkewitz, 1999; Haug, 1998). However, in contemporary
Sweden, proponents of the slogan clearly dominate, arguing among other things that any type of
organizational differentiation which is based on the classification of pupils according to their abil-
ities is a failure and must be attributed to teachers’ and pedagogy’s inability to handle the learning
problems of children with special needs (Davidson et al., 2003). In general, pedagogy tends to
regret the need for selection in schools, a tendency which is obvious in the debate on inclusion of
intellectually disabled children into regular classes. Every selection, the argument goes, is against
the “nature” of the educational system, since children can never be validly classified in terms
of performance. Instead of focusing on selection, education should focus on finding different
compensatory solutions, allocating extra resources and developing specially adapted programs in
order to increase each individual’s possibilities for learning (Emmanuelsson, 1976, 1995, 1997;
Emanuelsson, Persson, & Rosenqvist, 2001). Unsurprisingly from a systems-theoretical point of
view, the ambition behind “One school for all” now turns out to be difficult to achieve (Tideman,
1994, 1997a, 1997b), as new codes and new uses of codes (e.g., pass/not pass) need to be designed,
attitudes need to be changed, new pedagogical philosophies need to be developed, substantially
more complex classroom interaction systems need to be handled by retrained teachers and so
on.
However, the real problem with the idea behind “One school for all” is not that it is diffi-
cult to implement, but that it contains a false promise. We recall our earlier argument against
a merely topological understanding of “inclusion”. Our alternative is to observe inclusion as a
matter of participating in the communications that constitute a social system. In these terms, let-
ting intellectually disabled children be members of the same schools or – to a limited extent
– even the same classes does not entail that they lose their special organizational status. In
fact, it can be observed that schools which let normal and intellectually disabled children share
lessons find themselves forced to develop new organizational rules and routines in order to
reinforce the administrative boundaries between the two groups (e.g., teachers are required to
place differential demands on them, personal assistants have to be provided, among several other
things). Thus, it seems fair to say that even inclusion of intellectually disabled children at the
organizational level is characterized by a central dilemma. Put simply, inclusion into regular
classes is (and has to be) formally compensated by assignment of a special identity/status that
is functionally equivalent (at least from the perspective of the organization) to membership in
a special class or even school. Probably the only legitimate hope contained in the idea of “One
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school for all” is that the changed form of organizational exclusion permits interactive inclu-
sion of intellectually disabled children. The next section will argue that even this hope is hardly
justified.
Inclusion and exclusion at the interaction level
Inclusion and exclusion of children with intellectual disabilities occur not only at the macroso-
cial level of function systems and the mesosocial level of organizations, but also at the microsocial
level of individual interactions. At this level, the topological understanding of inclusion that we
criticized above is probably most tempting, but also most misleading. Superficially, children seem
to be included into classroom interaction as soon as they are allowed to participate. If one observes
in this superficial way, all interactive troubles can simply be attributed to “negative attitudes” or
lack of knowledge about disability (this attribution is problematized by Söder, 1990).
Once again, we suggest that a communication-based understanding avoids the theoretical pit-
falls of the topological conception of inclusion. Interaction systems are not physical arrangements
but sequences of communications that are exchanged among co-present persons. Conceived in this
way, participation in interaction is largely independent of the physiological or mental properties
of participants (e.g., intellectual impairments) as well as of participants’ attitudes toward each
other. Therefore, exclusion of disabled children from ordinary classes must be understood with
reference to communication, rather than with reference to children’s differences regarding bodily
or mental structures. Similar to the case of function systems, being excluded from a specific inter-
action system means not fully participating as a sender or receiver in its communications. Unlike
communication in function systems or organizations, participation and non-participation in inter-
action systems are extremely fleeting events. For instance, a bystander is turned into a participant
if one of the interactants asks him a question, and a participant turns into a non-participant when
he takes his leave or when other participants begin talking over his head (the latter phenomenon
occurring frequently in interaction between intellectually disabled and non-disabled individuals).
Intuitively, inclusion and exclusion should refer to more permanent states than participation and
non-participation. Although we do not think that it is possible to provide an uncontroversial oper-
ationalization of interactive inclusion, we suggest the following tentative definition. A potential
participant is interactively included if and only if (1) the participant is co-present and interactively
addressable, (2) the participant has the formal or moral right to assume the role of the speaker
and to make communicative contributions, and (3) the participant’s contributions are likely to
make an impact on the interaction, that is, they are likely to be met with (not necessarily positive)
replies. Criterion (1) involves that individuals are interactively excluded if they are forced to be
absent or if they are co-present but involved in other interactions, asleep, etc. Criterion (2) implies
that individuals are excluded if other participants deny them the right to take turns and to con-
tribute to the interaction. If individuals fail to anticipate this prohibition and take turns anyway,
the prohibition is effectively enforced by criterion (3), which states that individuals are excluded
if it is unlikely that any contribution they make is going to be dignified with some sort of reply,
including a negative reply, or any contribution is likely to meet nothing but a silencing reply (e.g.,
“shut up!”). Is it adequate to speak of “inclusion” if all one’s contributions meet criticism? We
believe so, for the simple reason that it is necessary to distinguish between conflict and ignorance.
A conflict is an interaction system which tends to force its participants to display a high degree
of involvement and to counter any claims which strengthen the opponents’ and weaken their own
position (Reich, 2003: chapter 4.3). Conflict is therefore a highly inclusive form of interaction.
Ignorance, on the other hand, is an entirely different form. By being ignored, a co-present partic-
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ipant is turned into a “non-person” (Goffman, 1967: p. 67) – an experience which can cause deep
psychological stress, thus functioning as a strong sanction against unwanted contributions. In this
perspective, a participant who speaks little but with great interactive consequences is interactively
included, while a participant who speaks a lot but never gets a reply is interactively excluded.
Co-presence is certainly a necessary condition for interactive inclusion, but it can now be seen
that it is not sufficient.
During the last decade, increasing social interaction between disabled and non-disabled chil-
dren has become an explicit goal of educational policy in Western Europe as well as North America.
The precise implementation of this goal varies strongly between countries, making cross-national
comparisons difficult. In the following, we will focus on the case of Sweden, mainly because
Sweden (together with other Scandinavian countries) has pursued the goal of interactively includ-
ing intellectually disabled children more aggressively than others. Its successes, but even more
its failures in achieving this goal are therefore particularly illuminating.
In the last section, we mentioned that special remedial classes and regular classes in Sweden
are now organizationally integrated in the sense that they both are under the authority of the
municipality and that they share the same building. This format fulfills two of the three aims
that were specified in a 1979 report by the Swedish Board of Education on the integration of
intellectually disabled pupils, that is, the goal of physical integration and the goal of functional
(e.g., administrative) integration (Tideman, 2004). It did not, however, increase what the report
termed “social integration”, that is, it did not lead to normal pupils fully accepting disabled pupils as
peers (Arnell-Gustavsson & Söder, 1979). This is illustrated by the fact that deeper social contacts
and friendships between disabled and non-disabled pupils are still rare (Tössebro, 1999; Hill &
Rabe, 1996; Tideman, 2000, 2004; Gustavsson, 2004). Researchers and policy-makers continue
to be surprised by the fact that physical integration and exclusion from interaction with peers
can coincide. We mentioned above that physical co-presence is only a necessary, not a sufficient
condition for interactive inclusion. We will now look at the ways in which this discrepancy is
reproduced and even reinforced in Swedish education.
As in other countries, the Swedish approach to increasing and improving social interaction
between disabled and non-disabled pupils that already go to the same school consists chiefly
of letting the pupils participate in shared lessons. However, rather than simply merging two
classes, which tends to work better for some subjects (e.g., physical education) than others,
Swedish schools generally apply the principle of “individual integration” (Stukát, 1986; Haskell
& Sparrow, 1989; Högberg, 1996). For each pupil who is registered in a special remedial class,
an individual decision is made regarding which of his or her lessons he or she is going to attend in
classes with non-disabled pupils (Wahlström, 2002). The pupil will then join this class but follow
the curriculum of a related lesson in a special remedial class. This noteworthy format is possible
because education in normal Swedish schools is nowadays mainly based on individual work
(exercises, self-paced reading, etc.) rather than dense teacher–pupil interaction. Furthermore, an
assistant must be present who supports intellectually disabled pupils in keeping up. There is
little research on how disabled and non-disabled pupils actually interact in integrated classes, an
obvious obstacle for such research being that there is almost no room for interaction in classes
that require pupils to focus on individualized tasks. Jensen and Ohlsson (1991) find that 75%
of intellectually disabled children that participate in such integrated classes state that they are
teased or even hassled by other pupils and that non-disabled children do not want to play with
them. Furthermore, 75% of intellectually disabled children are judged as having low self-esteem.
Hill and Rabe (1987) report that intellectually disabled pupils also have low status in integrated
classes.
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In absence of more fine-grained research, we hypothesize that certain interactive prob-
lems and tensions are likely to occur in integrated classes. In virtue of its design, the format
of individual integration fails to increase and improve social interaction as well as lasting
social contacts between the two types of pupils, essentially because there are few possibil-
ities for interaction to develop around questions, shared interests or exercises. In addition,
the simultaneous relevance of two different subject matters creates tensions and routinely
forces the teacher to prioritize the normal curriculum. Instead of including disabled pupils,
the format thus marks them not only as outsiders, but even as a burden on the rest of the
class. This problem is, if anything, reinforced by the fact that the performance of normal
pupils is subject to consequential evaluations, whereas the perceived outsiders are spared from
them.
In terms of the quantity of actual communicative exchanges, hardly more intergroup inter-
action appears to take place during recesses in the schoolyard – and if it takes place, it tends
to be extremely short and fleeting (Göransson, 1995). Nordström (2002) finds that intergroup
interaction, if it occurs, is often vertical or even patronizing, and that non-disabled children some-
times overtly avoid it by treating disabled children as non-persons. Horizontal interaction, mutual
support and solidarity are largely confined to children of the same age and with same or similar
intellectual disabilities. This overt exclusion from social interaction cannot be attributed to nega-
tive attitudes, among other reasons because attitudes to intellectually disabled children derive to
a large extent from interaction with these children (Hill & Rabe, 1994). At least in part, exclusion
emerges from the types of interaction in which children usually engage. For instance, as reported
by Nordström (2002), one important nucleus of intergroup conflicts and negative attitudes are
disputes over game rules. Failure to play by, and sometimes to grasp, game rules creates not only
conflicts, but interrupts the flow of the interaction (Ytterhus, 2002). Therefore, a stable finding is
that intellectually disabled children constitute less attractive companions in play than non-disabled
children.
Exclusion at the interaction level is often already manifesting in primary school, but it accen-
tuates as the children get older. In a study conducted by the Swedish Board of Education, teachers
and schoolmasters expressed that integration of intellectually disabled children into normal classes
becomes more difficult the older the children get (Wahlström, 2002; Nordström, 1997, who reports
similar results from international research). Again, it would be easy to mobilize attitudinal or other
psychological reasons in order to explain this finding. However, it must be kept in mind that differ-
ent paces of learning, different curricula and different socialization experiences (being/not being
subjected to constant evaluations in terms of grades) reinforce intellectual differences between
the two groups over time, thus contributing to the erosion of the common ground which seems
to be necessary for the development of mutual understanding as well as strong and lasting social
ties (Clark, 1993).
Thus, we conclude that the functional logic of the school system itself undermines the now-
popular efforts to increase interactive inclusion by letting intellectually disabled and non-disabled
pupils share classes. Once more, we describe this condition in terms of a dilemma – given the
largely unreformable shape of contemporary Western educational systems, physical inclusion
leads to interactive exclusion. In the case of Sweden, the time might be ripe to allow intellectually
disabled children to stay in the ghettoized but safe “natural enclaves” (Gustavsson, 1998) of their
classrooms. However, if physical co-presence fails to lead to interactive inclusion, how can phys-
ical separation be a remedy? To warrant policy recommendations, more research on interaction
between intellectually disabled and non-disabled children inside and outside the classroom is
certainly needed.
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Conclusion
There can be no doubt that an individual’s full inclusion into the educational system of a mod-
ern Western society is crucial for his or her participation in many other function systems, such as
economy, politics, science and even art. At the societal level, full inclusion means that grades and
certificates provide largely reliable information about the individual’s educational performance.
At the organizational level, full inclusion guarantees that the individual is not segregated adminis-
tratively from those pupils who are defined as normal. At the interaction level, full inclusion means
that the individual is exposed to normal subject matters and a normal secondary socialization.
For some time now, politicians and pedagogues have argued that the inclusion of intellectually
disabled individuals into society might be improved by way of strengthening their inclusion into
the educational system. Underlying this argument, there seems to be the vision of a cascade of
inclusion. First, abolishing the distinction between educable/uneducable children would lead to
full inclusion of intellectually disabled children at the level of the function system. Then, elim-
inating the distinction between normal/special schools as well as normal/special classes would
tear down administrative barriers to organizational inclusion of intellectually disabled children.
Finally, putting an end to discriminatory treatment of intellectually disabled children during inte-
grated lessons would allow these children to participate in normal interaction with non-disabled
children. As an overall result, the distinction between intellectually disabled and normal children
would cease to matter; both groups would have equal opportunities for participation in society
and share respect for each other.
In this article, we have tried to show that exclusion prevails at all three levels, although in
more subtle ways than visionaries might previously have imagined (or feared). At the societal
level, basic inclusion of intellectually disabled children into the educational system comes at the
price of their exclusion from one of the central functions of education, that is, exclusion from
performance evaluations. At the organizational level, inclusion into normal schools or normal
classes is bought at the expense of more individualistic but nonetheless momentous forms of
administrative differentiation, such as assignment of a “special status”. At the interaction level,
inclusion into normal lessons exposes intellectually disabled children to frequently discriminatory,
sometimes even stigmatizing treatment of normal children or even teachers.
In sum, this article argues that the idea of “One school for all” and the vision of a cascade
of inclusion are illusionary. On the contrary, inclusion of intellectually disabled children into the
educational system leads to re-exclusion at all social levels. Even worse, what seems to have
emerged deserves being called a cascade of exclusion, as attempts at strengthening inclusion
have led to new forms of exclusion at the respective next levels. Thus, basic inclusion at the
societal level has triggered new forms of exclusionary differentiation at the organizational level.
Elimination of these new differentiations has forced normal and intellectually disabled children
to interact more than before, but these interactions hardly deserve being called “inclusive”.
It seems fair to ask whether the idea of “One school for all” was consistent in the first place.
We believe that it involves a contradiction to identify one group of pupils as different from the
rest and to pretend afterwards that the educational system in general and schools in particular
are able to apply and ignore this distinction at one and the same time. However, we also realize
that while societal and organizational re-inclusion are ultimately paradoxical visions, interactive
re-inclusion is not. While the educational system and schools are obliged to treat normal and
intellectually disabled children differently, the children themselves – as well as their teachers – are
not. However, as we have argued above, co-presence is not a sufficient condition for being included
into an interaction system. Furthermore, as intellectually disabled children are organizationally
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marked as abnormal, those children who are not marked as abnormal usually have no reason to
ignore the institutionalized abnormality of intellectually disabled children.
The current debate on inclusion is – voluntarily or involuntarily – conditioned to respond to
the ongoing exclusion of intellectually disabled children from normal interactions with normative
arguments. This reflex does not and cannot do anything else than express moral indignation over
the current situation. However, indignation “no longer mobilizes any hope, taken for itself, it only
expresses dissatisfaction” (Luhmann & Schorr, 2000: p. 19). From a scientific point of view, it
is not going to provide us with new solutions. We therefore believe that normative arguments
are unsatisfactory. In a functionally differentiated society, morality fulfills residual functions
– for instance, securing people’s motivation, synchronizing their commitments, initiating and
focusing conflicts. Thus, moral norms are important, but seen from the point of view of how
educational communication is structured and organized, moral norms and values play a marginal
role. Education is not based on moral norms; it is not integrated on the basis of a consensus
regarding values. Rather, it is integrated on the basis of functions that it fulfills despite the fact
that those that participate in its communications subscribe to different moral norms.
We chose to label the problems that we discussed in this article as “dilemmas” because we
do not believe that they can be solved. They are not just practical problems, but products of
conflicting ambitions, logical paradoxes resulting from a simultaneous will to exclude and to
include. However, while social dilemmas cannot be solved, they can be acknowledged and dealt
with – and most importantly, their negative impact on the quality of life of certain individuals
can be eased. Perhaps the single most important step toward such reconciliation is for politicians
and pedagogues to concede that while disabilities may be a social construction, impairments are
not. Sufficiently significant differences in intellectual ability will always be observable, not only
for other psychic systems but also for social systems such as schools or commercial businesses.
As it is unlikely that the quality of life of individuals with reduced intellectual abilities can be
optimized through their total inclusion into the education system, possibly the most important
question is what pragmatic mixture of inclusion and selective exclusion is best suited to maximize
both the happiness of individuals and the functionality of the educational system.
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